Playing Word Games with New York’s No Surcharge Law by Coggins, Katie
Touro Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 2 Article 12 
2018 
Playing Word Games with New York’s No Surcharge Law 
Katie Coggins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Coggins, Katie (2018) "Playing Word Games with New York’s No Surcharge Law," Touro Law Review: Vol. 
34 : No. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 495 
 PLAYING WORD GAMES WITH NEW YORK’S NO 
SURCHARGE LAW 
Katie Coggins* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A handful of states, including New York, have laws that 
prohibit retailers from imposing an additional fee or surcharge on 
purchases made by credit.1  The purpose of these “no surcharge” laws 
is to protect consumers from unpredictable price increases at the 
register, and ultimately, to protect retailers from decreased sales.2  No 
surcharge laws encourage merchants to have a uniform price for all 
forms of payment, which then allow customers to depend on that 
uniform sticker price for their purchases.3  Also, customers are not 
 
*J.D., Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2018; B.B.A., Hofstra University, 2010.  
I would like to thank Professor Gary Shaw for his guidance and my Note Editors, Jessica 
Vogele, Joseph Tromba, and Rhona Mae Amorado, for their patience and hard work.  
1  David L. Hudson Jr., Cash or Credit?, 102 A.B.A.J. 17 (2016).  States that have a “no 
surcharge” law similar to New York include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Oklahoma and Texas. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-212 (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective Apr. 18, 2017 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb. (2017)); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133ff (West, Westlaw through enactments of Public Acts 
enrolled and approved by the Governor on or before May 16, 2017 and effective on or before 
May 16, 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.0117 (West, Westlaw through chapters from the 2017 
First Reg. Sess. of the 25th Leg. in effect through May 9, 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-
403 (West, Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2017 Reg. Sess. of the Kansas Leg. 
effective on or before Apr. 27, 2017.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-509 (West, Westlaw 
through emergency legis. through Ch. 47 of the 2017 First Reg. Sess. of the 128th Leg.); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140D, § 28A (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of the 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2012); 14A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2-211 (West, Westlaw 
through emergency effective provisions through Ch. 302 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 56th 
Leg. (2017)); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of the 2017 Reg. 
Sess. of the 85th Leg.). 
2 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2015). 
3 Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment 
Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 427-28 (2007). 
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subject to an additional fee, which they may perceive as a negative 
financial penalty.4  As a result, consumer credit card use is unrestrained 
and may result in higher profits for retailers.5  
Even though these laws appear to be beneficial on their face, 
they also have disadvantages to both merchants and consumers.6  For 
example, cash customers often pay the same price as credit customers 
because merchants are encouraged to have a uniform sticker price.7  
The issue, however, is that credit transactions cost merchants about six 
times more than cash transactions because credit card companies 
charge the merchant a fee for every single credit purchase made.8  As 
a result, customers end up paying for credit card fees in the sticker 
price because retailers increase the uniform sticker price to account for 
credit card fees.9    
Furthermore, the motives behind no surcharge laws have been 
called into question.10  States have adopted no surcharge laws largely 
due to heavy lobbying done by credit card companies in the 1980s.11  
Lobbying was directed at states with the largest populations, and 
hence, states with the most amount of credit card transactions.12  
California, Florida, New York and Texas, the four largest states in 
terms of population, all have a no surcharge statute.13   
In addition to the motives behind no surcharge laws, the 
interpretation of these laws has also been questioned.14  Recently, the 
constitutionality of New York’s no surcharge law, General Business 
Law (“GBL”) § 518, was brought before the United States Supreme 
Court in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman.15  In 1984, New 
 
4 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 122-23. 
5 Levitin, supra note 3, at 434, 444. 
6 Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Societal Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2008). 
7 Id. at 27-28. 
8 Samuel J. Merchant, Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction Surcharging and 
Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark Industry Changes, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 
327, 327-29 (2016). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 353-54. 
11 Id. at 353. 
12 Id. at 354. 
13 Merchant, supra note 8, at 354. 
14 See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017); Dana’s R.R. 
Supply v. Attorney Gen., Florida, 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015); Italian Colors Rest. v. 
Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73 (W.D. Tex. 
2016); People v. Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Crim. Ct. 1987). 
15 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144. 
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York passed GBL § 518 to prohibit sellers in any sales transaction to 
“impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu 
of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”16  While GBL § 518 
does not define “surcharge,”17 the Second Circuit, in Expressions, 
asserted that the “ordinary meaning” of surcharge is “a charge in 
excess of the usual or normal amount: an additional tax, cost, or 
impost.”18  The definition of surcharge is an issue in this case because, 
while the law clearly bans an additional charge on purchases made by 
credit, the statute has been interpreted to allow for a discount on 
purchases made by cash.19  Like the term surcharge, the New York 
statute does not define discount; thus, the Second Circuit relied on the 
Truth in Lending Act’s definition of discount as “a reduction made 
from the regular price.”20  The problem is that GBL § 518 also lacks a 
definition for regular price.21  Without a clear method to determine 
what the regular price is, merchants can manipulate prices so that credit 
customers pay more and cash customers pay less through either a cash 
discount or a credit surcharge.22  Therefore, retailers are uncertain 
whether their pricing schemes constitute discounts or surcharges 
because both create the same results––cash customers pay less and 
credit customers pay more.23   
In Expressions, the Second Circuit suggested that the 
difference between a surcharge and a discount is a common-sense 
distinction.24  However, the plaintiffs did not see the distinction.25  
They argued that credit surcharges and cash discounts could be 
construed as the same thing, just worded differently.26  The plaintiffs 
argued that, because GBL § 518 restricts speech, rather than conduct, 
GBL § 518 violates the First Amendment.27 
 
16 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2016). 
17 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 124. 
18 Id. at 127. 
19 Id. at 125. 
20 Id. at 128, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2017). 
21 Id. at 124. 
22 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
23 Id. 
24 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 127, 139, 142. 
25 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36. 
26 Brief for Petitioners at 2, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017) (No. 15-1391). 
27 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 444. 
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Lower federal courts are split as to whether no surcharge laws 
violate the First Amendment28 and the answer depends on whether no 
surcharge laws regulate speech or conduct.29  Courts that uphold no 
surcharge laws have held that the laws regulate conduct because they 
prevent retailers from performing the act of charging extra fees on 
credit purchases.30  Courts that strike down no surcharge laws have 
held that the laws regulate speech because the illegality of the conduct 
is determined by whether the conduct involves the use of the term cash 
discount or the term credit surcharge, regardless of the actual 
conduct.31   
It seems as if the split has been resolved because, in March 
2017, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that GBL § 518 is a speech 
regulation.32  However, the Court remanded the case back to the 
Second Circuit to decide whether GBL § 518 survives First 
Amendment scrutiny.33  The constitutionality of GBL § 518 depends 
on the level of scrutiny the Second Circuit will use, and this depends 
on what type of speech the Second Circuit determines to be at issue.34  
Some lower courts have found that no surcharge laws are restrictions 
of, specifically, commercial speech and have applied intermediate 
scrutiny to decide their constitutionality.35 
This Note argues that GBL § 518 violates the First Amendment 
as it unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech.  It also explains 
why commercial speech is at issue and how courts determine whether 
a law unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech.  This Note will 
be divided into eight sections.  Section II of the article sets a brief 
history of no surcharge laws.  Section III sets out how courts have ruled 
on the constitutionality of GBL § 518.  Section IV describes the 
relevant First Amendment principles that apply to the commercial 
speech doctrine.  Section V explains what commercial speech is.  
 
28 David L. Hudson Jr., Cash or Credit?, 102 A.B.A.J. 17, 17-18 (2016). 
29 Hudson, supra note 28, at 17. 
30 Hudson, supra note 28, at 17-18. 
31 Hudson, supra note 28, at 17-18. 
32 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147, 1151 (2017). 
33 Id. at 1147.  At the request of the Second Circuit, the parties have filed Supplemental 
Appellate Briefs detailing why or why not the Second Circuit should certify the interpretation 
of GBL § 518 to the Court of Appeals.  As of October 2017, the Second Circuit has not decided 
this issue. 
34 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (Breyer, concurring in the judgment). 
35 Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 
2015); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 12010 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
4
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Section VI sets out how courts determine whether a regulation 
impermissibly restricts commercial speech and how other courts have 
decided the constitutionality of no surcharge laws.  Section VII 
provides enforcement background of GBL § 518, and lastly, section 
VIII argues how the Second Circuit should decide Expressions. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CREDIT CARD SURCHARGE LAWS  
When credit card use began in the 1950s, the credit card 
industry was mostly unregulated.36  However, in 1968, Congress 
passed the Truth in Lending Act to prevent unfair credit practices.37  In 
the 1970s, the Truth in Lending Act was amended to allow discounts 
on purchases made by cash and to prohibit surcharges on purchases 
made by credit.38  After the Truth in Lending Act’s ban on surcharges 
lapsed, Congress passed the Cash Discount Act in 1981, which 
reinstated the credit surcharge ban for another three years.39 
The Cash Discount Act (“Act”) received sharp criticism from 
its inception.40  Specifically, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve (“Board”) expressed uncertainty about the Act in a 1981 
Senate Report,41 stating that surcharges were economically similar to 
cash discounts and allowing surcharges might be beneficial to 
consumers.42  The Board also noted that the Act had discouraged 
retailers from offering cash discounts because retailers do not want to 
risk noncompliance with the law.43  Adding to the futility of the law, 
the Board compared the Act’s discount/surcharge distinction to a half-
full/half-empty distinction.44  
 
36 Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Superbowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge 
Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 276 (2006). 
37 Truth in Lending Act, US LEGAL https://truthinlendingact.uslegal.com/ (last visited May 
21, 2017). 
38 Levitin, supra note 36, at 277-78. 
39 Levitin, supra note 36, at 278. 
40 See S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 8-9 (1981) (statement of Senator Bill Proxmire); Statement by 
Nancy H. Teethers, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Feb. 
18, 1981, 67 FED. RES. BULL. 235 (1981) [hereinafter Statement].  
41 Statement, supra note 40. 
42 Id. at 235. 
43 Id. at 236. 
44 Id.  The Board pointed out an “obvious difficulty in drawing a clear economic distinction 
between a permitted discount and a prohibited surcharge.”  Id.  According to the Board, 
“[d]iscounts and surcharges may not be as identical in practice as, say, a half-empty glass of 
5
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Furthermore, in another 1981 Senate report, one senator stated 
that merchants often account for credit card fees by increasing the 
regular price because they have no way of knowing which customers 
will pay cash or credit.45  The senator argued that cash-paying 
customers should not have to pay this subsidy charge, and merchants 
should have the choice of whether to impose a surcharge or not.46 
Eventually, Congress allowed the Act to lapse.47  However, in 
response to lobbying by the credit card industry, many states passed 
their no surcharge laws similar to the expired Act.48  Specifically, New 
York enacted GBL § 518 in 1984 as its own no surcharge law with 
language that was almost identical to the expired Act.49  
Recently, no surcharge laws adopted after the expiration of the 
Cash Discount Act have been challenged as unconstitutional 
restrictions of free speech.50  Particularly, the constitutionality of New 
York’s GBL § 518 has been challenged in Expressions.51 
III. EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN V. SCHNEIDERMAN 
In Expressions, the Second Circuit did not find GBL § 518 to 
be a restriction of commercial speech.52  Instead, the Second Circuit 
found GBL § 518 to be a permissible economic regulation without any 
speech implications.53  Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
water is to a half-full one. Nevertheless, it is difficult to quarrel with the fact that the distinction 
is, at best, uncertain.”  Id. 
45 S. REP. NO. 97-23, at 9. 
46 Id. 
47 See Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 123-25. 
48 Levitin, supra note 36, at 285-86. 
49 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 124.  Compare the no surcharge provision of the 
Cash Discount Act with GBL § 518.  “No seller in any sales transaction may impose a 
surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or 
similar means.” Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No.  94–222, § 3(c)(1), 90 Stat 197 (1976), 
amended by Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97–25, 95 Stat 144 (1981).  “No seller in any 
sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check, or similar means.” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2016). 
50 See Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., Florida, 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015); Italian 
Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 
73 (W.D. Tex. 2016). 
51 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144.  
52 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 141-42. 
53 Id. at 130. 
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remanded the case to the Second Circuit because it did find GBL § 518 
to be a speech regulation.54 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Five New York businesses (“plaintiffs”) brought an action 
against the Attorney General of New York, the District Attorney of 
New York County, and the District Attorney of Kings County ( 
“State”), alleging that GBL § 518 violated their right to freedom of 
speech under the First Amendment.55  The plaintiffs asserted that they 
want to charge credit card customers more than cash paying customers 
to make up for credit card fees imposed on them, but feared that to do 
so would violate GBL § 518.56   
Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted to decrease credit card use 
by imposing credit surcharges.57  They argued that a credit surcharge 
is a more effective way of communicating the cost of credit purchases 
to customers, rather than hiding the fee in the sticker price because, 
when customers are faced with a surcharge, they are more likely to 
become aware of credit card fees.58  The plaintiffs asserted that credit 
card swipe fees, which can be 2-3% of the purchase price per 
transaction, are a fast-growing burden to their businesses.59  They 
hoped that, if customers become aware of these fees, they would switch 
to cash.60   
On the other hand, the State argued that the credit surcharge 
ban protects costumers by encouraging a uniform sticker price, which 
prevents unfair and surprise price increases at the register.61  
 
54 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
55 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 121-22.  
Plaintiffs are Expressions Hair Design, a unisex hair salon in Vestal, New 
York, and its co-owner, Linda Fiacco; The Brooklyn Farmacy & Soda 
Fountain, Inc., an ice-cream parlor in Brooklyn, and its co-founder, Peter 
Freeman; Bunda Starr Corp., which owns a Manhattan liquor store, and 
its president, Donna Pabst; Five Points Academy, a Manhattan martial arts 
studio, and its vice president, Steve Milles; and Patio.Com LLC, an 
outdoor furniture and billiards company with stores throughout New 
York, and its founder and president, David Ross.   
Id. at 121 n.1. 
56 Id. at 126. 
57 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 437. 
58 Id. 
59 Id 
60 Id. 
61 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 437. 
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Furthermore, it asserted that GBL § 518 does not prevent retailers from 
imposing two different prices for credit and cash purchases; it only 
prohibits an extra fee added onto the credit price.62  Therefore, it 
argued, GBL § 518 allows retailers to impose a cash discount, which 
may similarly encourage customers to stop using credit.63  The State 
argued that the purpose of GBL § 518 is to require retailers to disclose 
higher credit prices to customers, not to limit how retailers word their 
pricing schemes.64 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found the State’s arguments to be “absurd.”65  The District 
Court exemplified the absurdity by stating that a merchant who 
displays a $100 price for cash and a $103 price for credit, including the 
3% surcharge, could still legitimately fear prosecution under the 
statute.66  Accordingly, The District Court found that GBL § 518 
restricted the plaintiffs’ expression of commercial speech.67  It held 
that GBL § 518 violated freedom of speech under the First Amendment 
because it regulated pricing system labels rather than regulating the 
actual pricing system itself.68  On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court had erred.69  
The Second Circuit held that New York’s no surcharge law does not 
violate the First Amendment.70   
1. Second Circuit Decision 
The Second Circuit reasoned that GBL § 518 regulated 
conduct, not speech, by prohibiting retailers from charging credit 
customers above the regular price paid by cash customers.71  In other 
words, the court held that price regulations did not implicate speech.72  
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 444. 
65 Id. at 443. 
66 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
67 Id. at 444-47. 
68 Id. at 444. 
69 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 127. 
70 Id. at 141-42. 
71 Id. at 135. 
72 Id. 
8
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The court then discussed several reasons why cash discounts are 
preferable to credit surcharges.73   
First, the court reasoned that a consumer’s reaction to the term 
“cash discount” is different than a consumer’s reaction to the term 
“credit surcharge”74 because the term cash discount is suggestive of 
saving money while the term credit surcharge is suggestive of losing 
money.75  Second, the court noted that credit surcharges are more likely 
to cause an increase in overall prices while cash discounts are more 
likely to cause a decrease in overall prices because surcharges tend to 
exceed the amount necessary for retailers to recover swipe fees.76 
The court then reasoned that GBL § 518 prohibited retailers 
from charging credit card customers a price higher than the regular 
price that cash customers pay77 while allowing cash customers to pay 
a price lower than the regular price that credit customers pay.78  As 
such, the statute regulated the relationship between cash price and 
credit price, not the labels of the different pricing systems.79  Because 
the court held that GBL § 518 regulated conduct, not speech, it did not 
apply a First Amendment analysis.80  Although the government is 
prohibited from regulating speech on the sole basis that listeners may 
have a negative reaction to it,81 the court noted that this rule did not 
apply to prices—the government may enact price control laws to 
control consumer demand.82  As such, the court held that GBL § 518 
was not a violation of free speech under the First Amendment83 
because its purpose was to increase consumer demand for credit 
spending by regulating prices, not by regulating labels.84   
 
73 Id. at 122-23. 
74 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 122. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 123. 
77 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 128. 
78 Id. at 128. 
79 Id. at 131. 
80 Id. at 130; Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
81 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 133. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 133-35. 
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2. U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit 
concluding, “[Section] 518 is not like a typical price regulation.”85  The 
Court determined that GBL § 518 regulates the way prices are 
communicated, rather than the prices themselves; hence, it is a speech 
regulation.86  However, the Court did not specify what type of speech 
is at issue or what level of scrutiny should be used to decide the 
constitutionality of GBL § 518.87  Instead, it remanded the case back 
to the Second Circuit to decide those issues.88   
The State argued that the New York Court of Appeals should 
certify the scope of GBL § 518 because the constitutionality of GBL § 
518 depends on the statutory interpretation of a state law.89 On the 
other hand, the plaintiffs argued that certification to the Court of 
Appeals is improper because the Supreme Court already determined 
that GBL § 518 is a speech regulation, which is not an unsettled 
question of state law.90  Nonetheless, in December, 2017, the Second 
Circuit did certify the scope of GBL § 518 to the New York Court of 
Appeals.91  It held that the level of scrutiny applied to its First 
Amendment analysis of GBL § 518 will depend on how GBL § 518 
actually operates in practice.92  Based on the Court of Appeals’ 
analysis as to how GBL § 518 actually operates, the Second Circuit 
will review GBL § 518 as either a disclosure regulation (a less exacting 
standard) or as a commercial speech regulation (using intermediate 
scrutiny).93 
The State argues that GBL § 518 should be reviewed as a 
disclosure regulation because § GBL 518 requires merchants to 
disclose the total price of a product, including the surcharge amount in 
 
85 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150. 
86 Id. at 1151. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Brief for Appellants at 10, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 
1144 (2017) (Nos. 13-4533, 13-4537) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. 
90 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2-3, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 
137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (Nos. 13-4533, 13-4537) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellees]. 
91 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 877 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2017). 
92 Id. at 102-03. 
93 Id. 
10
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the sticker price.94  However, the plaintiffs argue that GBL § 518 is not 
a disclosure regulation because disclosure regulations compel 
merchants to provide more information.95  The plaintiffs contend that 
GBL § 518 actually restricts the information that merchants could 
provide customers, and thus, should be reviewed under a commercial 
speech regulation standard.96  Furthermore, the plaintiffs point out that 
the U.S. Supreme Court already held in Expressions that GBL § 518 
“proscribes” speech, and therefore, is speech regulation, not a 
disclosure requirement.97 
A hallmark of the First Amendment is that Americans should 
have full access to information that is needed to make informed choices 
because their intelligent participation and input is needed in a 
democratic society.98  If the Second Circuit follows this principle, it 
should find that the commercial speech doctrine applies because GBL 
§ 518 forces merchants to hide information from the public, not 
disclose it.99  When credit surcharge information is suppressed, 
consumers are less likely to make informed economic choices.100 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
. . . .”101  The freedom of speech has been described as “fundamental 
to our notions of ordered liberty,”102 as it enables the free flow of 
information, which a democratic society needs to make intelligent 
choices.103  It protects a person’s right to choose to speak or not to 
speak, and the right to choose what to say and not to say.104  
First Amendment protection is not limited to speech, however; 
the First Amendment protects the communication of ideas through 
 
94 Brief for Appellants, supra note 89, at 16-17. 
95 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 91, at 14. 
96 Id. at 2. 
97 Id. at 14, citing Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152. 
98 Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 
135 (3d Cir. 1975). 
99 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 91, at 2, 13. 
100 Levitin, supra note 36, at 287-88.  
101 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
102 Asociacion de Trabajadores, 518 F.2d at 135. 
103 Id. 
104 Suarez v. Trigg Labs., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 5th 118, 123 (2016). 
11
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expressive conduct.105  In Spence v. Washington,106 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that expressive conduct is conduct that has a specific 
message and is likely to be perceived by others as an expression of that 
message.107  In Spence, the Court ruled that a man’s act of displaying 
an upside down American flag with peace symbols taped to it was 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.108  The Court 
stated this action was “expression of an idea through activity”109 
because the man desired to convey a specific message (which was to 
show that America stood for peace) and the message was likely to be 
understood.110  Therefore, the Court held the man’s action constituted 
expressive conduct, which was communication that afforded First 
Amendment protection.111 
The right to choose what to say and how to communicate it, 
however, is not completely unrestricted.112  Fighting words, obscenity 
and libel are examples of speech that may be restricted by the 
government. 113  These types of speech are given less First Amendment 
protection because they have been deemed as “low-value speech.”114  
Fighting words, obscenity and libel are deemed “low-value” speech 
because they are considered to be disruptive of social order and 
morality.115  
Although the order and morality of society plays a part in 
determining the First Amendment value of speech, the 
constitutionality of speech regulation largely depends on whether the 
 
105 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
106 Spence, 418 U.S. 405. 
107 Id. at 410-11. 
108 Id. at 415. 
109 Id. at 411. 
110 Id. at 410-11. 
111 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11. 
112 Joseph T. Hanlon, First Amendment Commercial Speech-Notwithstanding A State’s 
Twenty-First Amendment Power to Ban the Use of Alcohol Entirely, A State May Not 
Completely Prohibit Truthful, Non-Misleading Advertising of Liquor Prices-44 Liquor Mart 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 166 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1009, 1009, n.3 
(1997).  
113 Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why 
Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent for The 
Supreme Court to Abandon its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom Speech and Bring Obscenity, 
Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV 883, 887 
(1996). 
114 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 299 (1995). 
115 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
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regulation is content-based or content-neutral.116  To determine 
whether speech regulation is content-based, courts look to the 
legislative purpose behind the regulation.117  If the purpose behind the 
regulation is to suppress the content of a certain message, the 
regulation will be deemed content-based.118  If the purpose behind the 
regulation is unrelated to the content of a certain message, the 
regulation will be deemed content-neutral.119 
A. Content-Based Speech Regulation 
Whether a speech regulation is deemed content-based or 
content-neutral determines the level of scrutiny applied to a 
constitutional challenge to the regulation.120  Content-based 
regulations are usually subject to strict scrutiny because they are likely 
to improperly favor certain types of speech over others and may 
interrupt the free flow of information, which can mislead the public.121 
In Boos v. Barry,122 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down a 
content-based speech regulation that prohibited the display of signs 
criticizing foreign governments within 500 feet of a foreign embassy 
as a violation of the First Amendment.123  The Court concluded that 
the statute was content-based because the statute prohibited 
unfavorable speech about foreign governments while allowing 
favorable speech about foreign governments.124  The government’s 
justification for the regulation was to “protect the dignity of foreign 
diplomatic personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical of 
their governments.”125  Even though the Court held that the 
government had a compelling interest in maintaining civil relations 
with foreign officials,126 the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest because less restrictive alternatives were 
 
116 R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The 
Limitation of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 333 (2006). 
117 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Wright, supra note 116, at 334. 
121 Id. at 335. 
122 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
123 Id. at 334. 
124 Id. at 318-19. 
125 Id. at 321. 
126 Id. at 323-24. 
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available.127  The Court concluded that a less restrictive alternative was 
to allow “peaceful picketing” that did not “intimidate, coerce, threaten, 
or harass,” rather than banning all speech critical of foreign 
governments.128  Therefore, the Court held that the statute violated the 
First Amendment as an impermissible content-based speech 
regulation.129 
B. Content- Neutral Speech Regulation 
On the other hand, content-neutral regulations are subject to 
less judicial scrutiny.130  For example, speech may be regulated as to 
its time, place, and manner, provided that the content of a particular 
message is not the reason for the regulation.131  Regulations of the time, 
place, and manner of speech must be “narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”132  
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,133 the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld a content-neutral speech regulation that required performers at 
the Central Park band shell to use certain sound-amplification 
equipment and a specific sound technician provided by the city.134  The 
respondent argued that the regulation violated its First Amendment 
rights because the regulation constituted state control over artistic 
expression.135  However, the Court held that the city had a significant 
governmental interest in ensuring sufficient sound amplification at 
park events and in limiting the sound emanating outside the park.136  
The Court recognized that “those interests would have been less well 
served in the absence of the sound-amplification guideline.”137  
Therefore, the regulation of the time, place and manner of the musical 
content was deemed content-neutral because the purpose of the 
 
127 Boos, 485 U.S. at 329. 
128 Id. at 326. 
129 Id. at 324, 329. 
130 Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to 
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2006). 
131 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
132 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
133 Ward, 491 U.S. 781. 
134 Id. at 784. 
135 Id. at 792. 
136 Id. at 796-97. 
137 Id. at 802. 
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regulation was not to suppress any certain message.138  Furthermore, it 
did not violate First Amendment principles because the regulations 
were narrowly tailored to serve the city’s significant governmental 
interests.139 
The content-based/content-neutral distinction is important in 
the discussion of no surcharge laws because courts that strike down no 
surcharge laws deem them to be impermissible content-based 
regulations of commercial speech.140  Hence, the Second Circuit’s 
decision will turn on whether it finds GBL § 518 to be a content-based 
regulation of commercial speech.141   
V. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The courts have not developed a specific test to determine 
whether speech is commercial; as a result, whether speech is 
commercial in nature is often unclear.142  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”143  In addition, the 
Court has described commercial speech as speech that serves the 
interests of the speaker, assists consumers, and facilitates the flow of 
information.144  
Traditionally, commercial speech has been given a lesser 
amount of protection than other forms of constitutionally protected 
speech.145  Commercial speech is considered less deserving of 
protection because the state has the power to regulate commercial 
activity, which also includes speech concerning that activity.146  On the 
other hand, noncommercial speech, such as political speech, has been 
afforded greater First Amendment protection because: 
 
138 Ward, 491 U.S. at 792, 800-01. 
139 Id. at 803. 
140 See Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46, 450; Dana’s R.R. Supply v. 
Attorney Gen., Florida, 807 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2015); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 
99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1208-09 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
141 See Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. at 445-46, 450; Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 
F.3d at 1247; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1208-09. 
142 Scott Wellikoff, Mixed Speech: Inequities That Result from an Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 
St. John’s J. Legal Comment 159, 177 (2004). 
143 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980). 
144 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 561-62. 
145 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
146 Wellikoff, supra note 142, at 184-85. 
15
Coggins: New York’s No Surcharge Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
510 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation 
of the system of government established by our 
Constitution.  The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression in order 
“to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired 
by the people.”147  
In contrast, commercial speech has not traditionally been 
thought of as integral to the exchange of ideas needed in a democratic 
society.148  However, it has been afforded some protection because the 
commercial nature of speech does not render it completely “valueless 
in the marketplace of ideas.”149  The public relies on the free flow of 
commercial information to make intelligent economic choices150 and 
to suppress this information from the public “defeats the purpose of the 
First Amendment.”151  
Before the 1970s, it was unclear whether commercial speech 
should be afforded protection under the First Amendment at all.152  It 
was not until 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,153 that the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that speech could not be restricted simply because its content is 
commercial in nature.154  In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Court struck down a state law that prohibited pharmacists from 
advertising prescription drug prices155 because it held that a purely 
commercial advertisement might still be of general public interest that 
deserves First Amendment protection.156   
The Court noted that prescription drug consumers had an 
interest in the availability of prescription drug prices because the 
elderly, sick, and disabled had limited means to shop for the cheapest 
 
147 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 595-96 (1980), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
148 Wellikoff, supra note 142, at 168. 
149 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). 
150 Wellikoff, supra note 142, at 169. 
151 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 567. 
152 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976). 
153 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
154 Id. at 761-62. 
155 Id. at 750, 773. 
156 Id. at 764. 
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drugs, and the availability of drug pricing information could be life 
changing.157  As such, the Court reasoned that the public has an interest 
in receiving information to make informed and intelligent economic 
choices, which, in turn, facilitates the free flow of information that is 
necessary for the decision-making process of democracy.158  
Additionally, it stated that the effect of the ban on prescription drug 
pricing advertising was to keep consumers in the dark regarding their 
choices.159  Hence, the Court concluded that the state had the power to 
regulate the pharmaceutical industry, but not at the expense of keeping 
the public in ignorance.160  Commercial speech, such as the speech at 
issue in this case, was finally deemed protected by the First 
Amendment.161 
Nevertheless, commercial speech is afforded less protection 
than other forms of speech as regulations of commercial speech are 
only subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny.162  Courts use the 
intermediate scrutiny test established in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,163 to 
determine whether a regulation of commercial speech violates the First 
Amendment.164 
In Central Hudson, the Public Service Commission of New 
York (“Commission”) ordered all electric utility companies in the state 
to stop running advertisements that encouraged the use of electricity 
because the State’s electric utility companies did not have enough fuel 
to meet customer demand for the winter of 1973-74.165  In 1977, the 
Commission decided to extend the ban to help decrease energy 
consumption even after the fuel shortage was over,166 but allowed 
“informational” advertising to help control customer demand for 
electricity.167  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. sued the 
Commission, arguing that the Commission’s order violated the First 
 
157 Id. at 763-64. 
158 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
159 Id. at 769. 
160 Id. at 770. 
161 Id. at 770. 
162 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
163 Id. at 557, 566. 
164 Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the 
Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1626, 1626-29 (1997). 
165 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 559. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 560. 
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and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on commercial speech.168  
The trial court, the intermediate appellate court, and the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s order.169  However, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the 
Commission’s order unconstitutionally restricted commercial 
speech.170 
The Court articulated a four-part test to determine whether a 
governmental regulation unconstitutionally restricts commercial 
speech in violation of the First Amendment.171  First, the commercial 
speech in question cannot be misleading and must concern lawful 
activity.172  Second, the law in question must have a substantial 
governmental interest, and the commercial speech cannot be banned 
due to an unsupported belief of harm.173  Third, the law must be 
narrowly tailored and directly advance the asserted governmental 
interest.174  Fourth, the law cannot be more extensive than necessary to 
serve the governmental interest.175   
Applying this four-part test, the Court held the ban against 
electricity advertisements violated the First Amendment.176  First, the 
Court reasoned that the commercial speech in question was neither 
misleading nor concerning unlawful activity.177  Second, the Court 
stated that the State’s asserted interest in energy conservation and fair 
rates were substantial governmental interests because the United States 
was dependent on energy resources from other countries, where the 
United States government had no control over the quantity and price; 
hence, energy conservation and fair rates were needed to ensure an 
 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 560-61. 
170 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 561. 
171 Id. at 566. 
172 Id.  
173 Linmark Assocs v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 n.6 (1977).  Overall, the 
government bears the burden in proving a substantial interest and will only meet that burden 
if the harm that the government seeks to prevent is real and not mere speculation, and the 
restriction on commercial speech will alleviate that harm. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 
527 U.S. at 183; Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1963). 
174 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n 
v. U.S., 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).  Although the government is not required to use the “least 
restrictive means conceivable,” a law that only weakly supports the governmental interest will 
not be upheld.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188. 
175 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
176 Id. at 561. 
177 Id. at 566-67. 
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adequate supply of energy resources for itself and its citizens.178  Third, 
the Court found that the advertising ban supported the State’s interest 
in conserving energy because it helped to decrease the energy 
demand.179  Ultimately, however, and for the fourth part of the test, the 
Court reasoned that the advertising ban was more extensive than 
necessary to support the governmental interest in conserving energy180 
because the ban prevented the appellants from advertising energy 
efficient products and restricted speech that did not harm the State’s 
interest in energy conservation.181  Therefore, the Court held that, due 
to the State’s failure to prove the fourth element, the advertising ban 
violated the First Amendment.182 
The U.S. Supreme Court continues to use the four-part test 
developed in Central Hudson to determine whether a government 
regulation restricts commercial speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.183  However, to determine whether commercial speech is 
at issue is not always an easy task.184  As stated above, the courts have 
not developed a specific test to identify commercial speech.185  
Consequently, courts have differing opinions as to whether no 
surcharge laws involve commercial speech.186 
VI. NO SURCHARGE LAWS AS RESTRICTION ON SPEECH OR 
CONDUCT? 
In the Fifth Circuit decision, Rowell v. Pettijohn,187 the Court 
of Appeals held that Texas’s no surcharge law solely regulates 
economic conduct, not speech.188  However, a California District Court 
 
178 Id. at 568. 
179 Id. at 569. 
180 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp, 447 U.S. at 569-70. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 571. 
183 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571-72 (2011); Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 184; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504-08 
(1996). 
184 Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 
1154-55 (2012). 
185 Wellikoff, supra note 142. 
186 See Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney Gen., Florida, 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015); 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2015); Rowell v. Pettijohn, 
816 F.3d 73 (W.D. Tex. 2016); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 
430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
187 Rowell, 816 F.3d 73. 
188 Id. at 76. 
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in Italian Colors Restaurant v. Harris,189 and the Eleventh Circuit in 
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney General, Florida,190 both held that the 
no surcharge laws at issue were regulations of commercial speech.191  
Oddly, the no surcharge laws at issue in all three cases were almost 
identical, yet, two courts found speech to be at issue and one did not.192  
This section explains why or why not these courts found the no 
surcharge laws to involve commercial speech.193  Additionally, this 
section explains why courts that found commercial speech to be at 
issue also found that the no surcharge laws failed the Central Hudson 
test in violation of the First Amendment.194   
A. No Surcharge Law as Purely Economic Regulation 
In Rowell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
that the Texas no surcharge law is a permissible economic regulation 
and does not violate the First Amendment as the law does not implicate 
speech.195  The Texas no surcharge law reads, “[A] seller may not 
impose a surcharge on a buyer who uses a credit card for an extension 
of credit instead of cash, a check, or a similar means of payment.” 196 
The plaintiffs, a group of Texas merchants, sued the Texas 
Commissioner of the Office of Consumer Credit, arguing that the 
Texas no surcharge law violated their First Amendment rights as a 
content-based restriction of commercial speech.197  The plaintiffs 
wanted to charge two different prices for cash and credit purchases, 
but asserted that the law prevented them from effectively 
communicating their pricing systems.198  The court disagreed, 
 
189 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199. 
190 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d 1235. 
191 Id. at 1247-49; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1208-09. 
192 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. 
§ 501.0117 (West, Westlaw through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth 
Legislature); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of the 2017 Reg. 
Sess. of the 85th Leg.). 
193 See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d 1235; Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d 118; Rowell, 
816 F.3d 73; Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 
3d 1199. 
194 See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1247; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1208-
09. 
195 Rowell, 816 F.3d at 76. 
196 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 339.001 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of the 2017 Reg. Sess. 
of the 85th Leg.). 
197 Rowell, 816 F.3d at 77. 
198 Id. at 77-78. 
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reasoning that it could not “bootstrap” the economic conduct 
prohibited by the no surcharge law with an element of speech.199  The 
Court held that based on a plain reading of the statute, the statute 
simply bans surcharges on credit purchases as a form of price 
control.200  
Moreover, the court noted that price-control laws have never 
been determined to implicate speech, as the state has the power to set 
price restrictions.201  As such, it held that the no surcharge law is only 
an incidental burden on speech,202 and compared this law to a 
regulation that required restaurant owners to ask customers to 
extinguish their cigarettes.203  Therefore, the court held that the Texas 
no surcharge law is simply a regulation of economic conduct and does 
not violate the First Amendment.204 
As discussed above, the Second Circuit in Expressions Hair 
Design used reasoning similar to the Fifth Circuit in this case, also 
finding that New York’s no surcharge law is purely an economic 
regulation.205  However, in the following cases, courts have found no 
surcharge laws to be more than just economic regulations.206 
B. No Surcharge Law as Commercial Speech 
Restriction 
1. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney General, 
Florida 
In Dana’s R.R. Supply, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit struck down Florida’s no surcharge law.207  Four 
retailers received cease and desist letters from the State after telling 
 
199 Id. at 80. 
200 Id. at 82. 
201 Id. at 82. 
202 Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83. 
203 Id. at 82-83.  In Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that a law which required bar owners to verbally request that patrons put out their 
cigarettes did not violate the bar owners’ First Amendment rights because the law regulated 
conduct, not speech.  522 F.3d 533, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2008).  The Fifth Circuit held that the 
law’s burden on speech was only incidental to the law’s regulation of conduct as the verbal 
requirement was a necessary step in prohibiting smoking in public places.  Id.  
204 Rowell, 816 F.3d at 83. 
205 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 141-42. 
206 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1247; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1208-09. 
207 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1239. 
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their customers that they must pay a fee for using a credit card.208  
These retailers preferred to use the term surcharge rather than cash 
discount because they felt that the term surcharge was more accurate 
and transparent.209  If the retailers had used the term cash discount, they 
would not have received the cease and desist letters under Florida’s no 
surcharge law.210  The retailers brought suit, alleging that Florida’s law 
violated the First Amendment as a restriction of free speech.211  The 
court struck down Florida’s no surcharge law as a violation of free 
speech under the First Amendment.212  
The court examined whether Florida’s no surcharge law 
restricted speech or conduct.213  The relevant parts of Florida’s no 
surcharge law read: 
A seller . . . in a sales . . . transaction may not impose a 
surcharge on the buyer . . . electing to use a credit card 
in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means, if 
the seller . . . accepts payment by credit card. A 
surcharge is any additional amount imposed at the time 
of a sale . . . that increases the charge to the buyer . . . 
for the privilege of using a credit card to make payment 
. . . .214 
The court reasoned that the only way to violate Florida’s law 
was to describe the price distinction as a credit surcharge instead of 
cash discount, thereby targeting the expression of the price distinction 
alone.215  Specifically, it explained that “surcharges and discounts are 
nothing more than two sides of the same coin; a surcharge is simply a 
‘negative’ discount, and a discount is a ‘negative’ surcharge.”216  As 
such, the court comically concluded that the law should have been 
called the “surcharges-are-fine-just-don’t-call-them-that law.”217  
Therefore, it held that Florida’s no surcharge law was a restriction on 
 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1240. 
210 Id. at 1239-40. 
211 Id.  
212 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d. at 1251. 
213 Id. at 1241. 
214 FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (West, Westlaw through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 
Twenty-Fourth Legislature). 
215 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245. 
216 Id. at 1239. 
217 Id. 
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wording, not conduct, and was protected under the First 
Amendment.218 
The court did not specifically decide whether the speech at 
issue was speech in general or commercial speech.219  Instead, it 
vaguely stated, “Florida’s no-surcharge law directly targets speech to 
indirectly affect commercial behavior . . . by discriminating on the 
basis of the speech’s content, the identity of the speaker, and the 
message being expressed.”220  While the court’s statement suggests a 
content-based restriction on speech warranting strict scrutiny review, 
the court instead decided to apply intermediate scrutiny under the 
Central Hudson test because the law had the “flavor of commercial 
speech” in that it appeared to regulate business pricing systems.221  
Under the Central Hudson test,222 the court first reasoned that 
the law did not target false or misleading speech because a pricing 
system description as either a surcharge or a discount is not false or 
misleading.223  The court compared this distinction to describing the 
weather as either warmer or colder, which is, in effect, a statement of 
fact and neither false nor misleading.224  Second, the court failed to 
find a substantial governmental interest in Florida’s no surcharge 
law.225  While the state argued that it had an interest in consumer fraud 
protection, protection from unfair surprises at the register, and price 
uniformity among merchants,226 the court held that these interests were 
neither substantial nor persuasive because the state failed to explain 
why “convenience fees” on certain credit transactions were allowed 
and not credit surcharges.227  Third, the court held that Florida’s no 
surcharge law was not narrowly tailored and did not directly advance 
the asserted governmental interests of consumer fraud protection, 
protection from unfair surprises at the register, and price uniformity 
among merchants because such interests would be better served by the 
regulation of specific behavior.228  Fourth, the court reasoned that the 
 
218 Id. at 1246. 
219 Id.  
220 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1239. 
221 Id. at 1247. 
222 Id. at 1249; Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
223 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1249. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 1249. 
226 Id. at 1249-50. 
227 Id. at 1250. 
228 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1250. 
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state could have used a plethora of less restrictive alternatives to the no 
surcharge law, such as completely banning dual pricing systems, 
capping the difference in price that can be charged to credit and cash 
customers, banning specific deceptive trade practices, or requiring 
retailers to disclose their pricing policies.229  Consequently, the law 
was deemed more extensive than necessary because the state did not 
use any of these less restrictive alternatives.230 
Therefore, the court held that Florida’s no surcharge law failed 
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test and was an 
unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech under the First 
Amendment.231  The California District Court in Italian Colors had a 
similar holding.232 
2. Italian Colors Restaurant v. Harris 
In Italian Colors, the California District Court struck down 
California’s no surcharge law.233  The plaintiffs, five California 
businesses, sued the California Attorney General, alleging that 
California’s no surcharge law violated their First Amendment rights as 
an impermissible restriction on commercial speech.234  In their 
complaint, they asserted that they preferred to label the higher price for 
credit card payments as a surcharge because they wanted to discourage 
customers from using credit cards by using a word with a negative 
connotation.235  As such, they argued that California’s no surcharge 
law did not regulate pricing systems, but instead regulated how 
retailers could describe their pricing systems.236  Conversely, the 
Attorney General argued that the no surcharge law only prohibited 
retailers from adding on an additional fee to the regular sticker price 
for purchases made by credit.237  He also pointed out that the purpose 
of the statute was to prevent “bait and switch” tactics in which 
customers would unknowingly be sprung with an extra fee at the 
 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 1250-51. 
231 Id. at 1251. 
232 See Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. 
233 Id. 
234 Id.  
235 Id. at 1204. 
236 Id.  
237 See Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
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register.238  Furthermore, the Attorney General insisted that the statute 
did not implicate speech and should only be subject to rational basis 
review, as it was an economic regulation.239 
The relevant parts of California’s no surcharge law read as 
follows: 
(a) No retailer . . . may impose a surcharge on a 
cardholder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check, or similar means.  A retailer 
may, however, offer discounts for the purpose of 
inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not 
involving the use of a credit card . . . .240   
The District Court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and 
held that the no surcharge law was an unconstitutional restriction on 
free speech because it did not dictate how retailers should assign 
prices,241 but instead dictated how prices were communicated to 
customers.242  Specifically, it held that “[a]n individual’s right to speak 
is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to 
‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’ or 
disseminated.”243  Although the retailers were free to speak about 
credit card fees with their customers, they were still limited in the way 
that they could express that information.244  
In addition, the court pointed out that the law made an 
exception for surcharges imposed by gas, electric and water utilities.245  
Hence, the law singled out a specific class of speakers, and did so 
without any identified reason, which is impermissible under the First 
Amendment.246  Also, the court concluded that the law was a content-
based regulation because its purpose was to suppress the message that 
credit transactions cost more than cash payment transactions.247  As the 
statute was deemed to be a “content-based, speaker-specific” 
 
238 Id.  
239 Id.  
240 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
241 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 1208 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011) (quoting 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)). 
244 Id. at 1207-08. 
245 See Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1207-08. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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regulation of commercial speech, the court applied the Central Hudson 
test.248  
First, the court held that although surprise credit purchase fees 
at the register may be misleading, the state cannot ban information 
simply because it has the potential to be misleading and when it can be 
presented straightforwardly.249  It noted that an alternative non-
deceptive way to inform customers about credit purchase surcharges 
could be to display surcharge information throughout the store and 
explain that the surcharge is due to merchant swipe fees.250  This, the 
court reasoned, would lead to the distribution of accurate 
information.251 
Second, the court addressed the state’s asserted interest in the 
regulation.252  The intent of the legislature was set out in the statute as 
follows: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to promote the 
effective operation of the free market and protect 
consumers from deceptive price increases for goods 
and services by prohibiting credit card surcharges and 
encouraging the availability of discounts by those 
retailers who wish to offer a lower price for goods and 
services purchased by some form of payment other than 
credit card.253 
The court noted that, while the prevention of consumer 
deception is significant, the harm associated with that interest must not 
be speculative.254  It reasoned that the state’s asserted interest could not 
be substantial because the statute created an exception for government 
utilities.255  Thus, the actual harm at issue was called into question.256 
The court then appeared to skip over the third part of the 
Central Hudson test and jumped to the last prong instead.257  It argued 
that the statute was broader than necessary because a more direct way 
 
248 Id. at 1209. 
249 Id.; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
250 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1209. 
251 Id. 
252 Id.  
253 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
254 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1209. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 1209-10. 
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to prevent consumer deception would be to require the disclosure of 
surcharges.258  As an example, the court pointed to a Minnesota statute 
that allows surcharges on the condition that retailers inform “the 
purchaser of the surcharge both orally at the time of sale and by a sign 
conspicuously posted on the seller’s premises.”259  Hence, the court 
found that California’s no surcharge statute was broader than 
necessary and an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech 
because it did not pass the Central Hudson test.260 
The California District Court in Italian Colors and the Eleventh 
Circuit in Dana’s R.R. Supply both came to the right conclusion that 
the no surcharge laws at issue are impermissible restrictions of 
commercial speech.261  Both laws involve a commercial transaction 
and are content-based speech regulations.262  The Second Circuit 
should similarly find GBL § 518 to be a content-based regulation of 
commercial speech.263  The enforcement history of GBL § 518 
supports the conclusion that it is a content-based regulation of 
commercial speech.264 
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF GBL § 518  
In People v. Fulvio,265 a complaint was filed against a gas 
station owner for violating GBL § 518.266  A gas station customer 
paying with a credit card was told to pay five cents per gallon higher 
than the cash price for gas.267  The customer stated that only the cash 
price was advertised on the gas station’s sign, although this fact was 
disputed.268  After the customer complained, the defendant gas station 
owner, Fulvio, allowed him to pay the cash price.269  The customer 
then filed a complaint against Fulvio, arguing that his pricing policy 
 
258 Id. at 1210. 
259 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1210; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.051(1)(a) (West, 
Westlaw through laws of the 2017 Reg. Sess. through May 13, 2017). 
260 Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1210. 
261 Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1247; Italian Colors Rest., 99 F. Supp. 3d at 1208-09. 
262 Id. 
263 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. 557. 
264 See People v. Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Crim. Ct. 1987). 
265 Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1008. 
266 Id. at 1009. 
267 Id. at 1010. 
268 Id.  
269 Id.  
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was in violation of GBL § 518 as an impermissible credit surcharge.270  
In opposition, Fulvio argued that the pricing policy was a cash discount 
program and his signs clearly listed two different prices for cash and 
credit.271  Fulvio was ultimately convicted of an attempt to violate GBL 
§ 518.272  
Fulvio moved to dismiss on the grounds that GBL §518 
violated his substantive due process rights as the law is impermissibly 
vague, arbitrary and capricious.273  The court held that GBL § 518 did 
violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights, and granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.274 
The court held that GBL § 518 was unconstitutional as applied 
on due process grounds.275  It reasoned that a conviction under this 
statute depended solely on whether the word surcharge or cash 
discount was used, not on the defendant’s actual conduct.276  It 
declared that, under GBL § 518, the terms credit surcharge and cash 
discount could be used interchangeably to describe the same 
conduct.277  The court added that even if a cash discount was intended, 
it was easy to phrase incorrectly as a credit surcharge.278  For example, 
an unsophisticated employee may have unintentionally violated the 
statute by simply explaining to a customer that the credit price was 
higher than the cash price, even if the employee meant to say the 
opposite.279  Therefore, the court held that GBL § 518 was 
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case because Fulvio’s 
conviction was based on the use of a certain word, not because of a 
specific act.280 
Although GBL § 518 was not challenged on First Amendment 
grounds in this case, the enforcement of GBL § 518 was clearly based 
on the content of the defendant’s speech.281  The defendant’s 
conviction was based on the use of the unfavorable term, credit 
 
270 Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1010-11. 
271 Id. at 1010. 
272 Id. at 1009. 
273 Id.  
274 Id.  
275 Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. 
276 Id. at 1011. 
277 Id. at 1013-15. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. at 1013-14. 
280 Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. 
281 See Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. 
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surcharge, rather than the favorable term, cash discount.282  Based on 
this prior enforcement history283 and the fact that U.S. Supreme Court 
has already decided that GBL § 518 does implicate speech,284 the 
Second Circuit should find GBL § 518 to be an unconstitutional 
restriction of speech. 
VIII. SECOND CIRCUIT SHOULD HOLD NEW YORK’S NO 
SURCHARGE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that GBL § 518 
does implicate speech, two other issues are left unresolved. 285  The 
first is whether GBL § 518 regulates commercial speech, and the 
second is whether GBL § 518 violates the First Amendment.286   The 
Second Circuit should rule in favor of the plaintiffs, as GBL § 518 is 
clearly a content-based regulation of commercial speech and does not 
pass the Central Hudson commercial speech test.287    
Justice Roberts correctly stated that GBL § 518 implicates 
speech.288  Currently, GBL § 518 does not require retailers who wish 
to charge different prices for cash and credit to disclose the cash price, 
regular price, and credit price.289  Without a requirement for retailers 
to post all three prices, customers have no way of knowing what the 
regular price is and whether the cash price is actually a discount.290   
The Second Circuit defined a surcharge as “a charge in excess 
of the usual or normal amount: an additional tax, cost, or impost.”291  
The State exemplified a surcharge as an extra fee added onto a credit 
purchase, after the customer already received the bill stating the 
regular price.292  This scenario used by the State constitutes an 
unanticipated charge.293  The definition of surcharge used by the 
Second Circuit does not mention an unanticipated charge, only a 
 
282 Id. at 1011-15. 
283 Id. at 1008. 
284 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1147. 
285 Id. at 1151. 
286 Id. 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
287 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. 557. 
288 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1147. 
289 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2016). 
290 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36. 
291 Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 127. 
292 Brief for Respondents at 1, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017) (No. 15-1391) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
293 Id. at 7, 49. 
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charge in addition to the regular price.294  Therefore, it would seem as 
if GBL § 518 prohibits higher prices for credit purchases across the 
board.295  However, GBL § 518 allows lower prices for cash purchases, 
which is mathematically the same as allowing higher credit prices.296   
Consequently, retailers can frame a pricing scheme as a cash 
discount, when it is actually a credit surcharge because customers have 
no way of knowing what the regular price is.297  Therefore, whether 
retailers comply with GBL § 518 is completely dependent upon how 
their pricing schemes are worded, rather than their economic 
conduct.298  Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in holding that 
GBL § 518 involves the regulation of speech.299 
The issue then is whether GBL § 518 is a content-based speech 
regulation.300  GBL § 518 is a content-based speech regulation if the 
purpose of the law is to promote certain favorable speech over certain 
unfavorable speech and less restrictive alternatives are available.301  
The State stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect consumers 
from practices that would place them at a disadvantage and to reduce 
confusion.302  In other words, the purpose of GBL § 518 is to promote 
the use of cash discounts and restrict the use of credit surcharges to 
support the economy.303  Hence, as stated above, because cash 
discounts and credit surcharges are merely different wordings for the 
same conduct, GBL § 518 favors speech that allows cash discounts, 
over speech that allows credit surcharges.   
Additionally, less restrictive means are available to protect 
consumers and reduce confusion.304  As stated by the Eastern District 
of California, another less restrictive alternative is for retailers to 
display surcharge information throughout their stores and to explain to 
customers that surcharges are due to merchant swipe fees.305  This 
alternative would protect customers from unfair practices and reduce 
 
294 See Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 127. 
295 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 292, at 1. 
296 See Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 128. 
297 Expressions Hair Design, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36. 
298 Fulvio, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 1015. 
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confusion without favoring one type of speech over another.306  
Therefore, the Second Circuit should find that GBL § 518 is a content-
based speech regulation because it favors one type of speech over 
another when less restrictive means are available. 
On the other hand, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his 
concurring opinion in Expressions, “virtually all government 
regulation affects speech.”307  Furthermore, he stated that “[h]uman 
relations take place through speech.”308  Hence, he asserted that the 
focus should be on whether a regulation affects interests protected by 
First Amendment, not on whether a regulation affects conduct or 
speech.309  Following Justice Breyer’s reasoning, courts that dismissed 
the speech implications of no surcharge laws applied the wrong 
analysis.310  The analysis should have been based on whether no 
surcharge laws are consistent with the First Amendment principle of 
the free flow of information in a democratic society.311 
In view of Justice Breyer’s reasoning, GBL § 518 does affect 
the free flow of information.312  The ban on surcharges hinders how 
retailers communicate the price of credit transactions to their 
customers and keeps customers in the dark as to the true cost of their 
payment methods.313  Using the phrase cash discount, rather than credit 
surcharge, does not put consumers on alert as to the high swipe fees 
imposed by credit companies on retailers for every credit 
transaction.314  Therefore, First Amendment analysis is warranted 
because GBL § 518 contradicts the First Amendment principle of the 
free flow of information needed to make informed choices.315 
The next issue is what level of scrutiny the court should apply, 
which depends on what type of speech is at issue.316  The New York 
Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that GBL § 518 involves 
 
306 Id. 
307 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
308 Id. 
309 Id.  
310 See id. at 1152-53. 
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312 David L. Hudson Jr., Folding Cards, Merchants Call Loss of ‘Swipe Fees’ a 1st 
Amendment Violation, 99-OCT A.B.A. J. 18, 19 (2013). 
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315 See Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico, 518 F.2d at 135. 
316 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S.Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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commercial speech.317  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., commercial speech is “expression 
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.”318  The communication of whether a pricing scheme is a 
credit surcharge or a cash discount is expression of an economic 
interest by retailers to their customers.  Therefore, the Second Circuit 
should apply the Central Hudson test because GBL § 518 is a content-
based restriction on commercial speech.319   
Furthermore, the Second Circuit should find that GBL § 518 
fails the Central Hudson test.320  Under the first prong, allowing 
surcharges is neither misleading nor concerning unlawful activity.321  
Although surcharges are technically banned, the state still allows 
retailers to post prices for credit purchases that are higher than the 
regular price as long as the retailer calls it a cash discount and not a 
surcharge.322  Therefore, the activity of a surcharge is lawful, but not 
the label of surcharge for that activity.323  In addition, imposing 
surcharges is not misleading because it would open communication 
between customers and retailers regarding credit card fees.324  Without 
surcharges, customers are unaware of the fees that they and retailers 
pay for using credit cards.325  When credit purchases and cash 
purchases are one single price, the true cost of credit card use is 
hidden.326  Surcharges allow customers to have full knowledge of the 
cost of credit card use and promote transparency in pricing policies, 
and therefore, are not misleading.327 
General Business Law § 518 fails the second prong of the 
Central Hudson test because, even though the State argued that the law 
prevents false advertising and bait-and-switch tactics,328 which can be 
deemed a substantial governmental interest, the harm caused by 
 
317 Id. at 1152-53. 
318 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 561. 
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surcharges is merely speculative.329  As discussed above, serious doubt 
was expressed in the Senate Committee Report for the Cash Discount 
Act as to the benefits of the no surcharge law.330  The Committee 
asserted that the effect of the law was actually a credit subsidy that 
increased prices for cash and credit customers alike.331  In addition, 
because the difference between a discount and a surcharge is so blurry, 
retailers simply charge one single price to account for the swipe fees 
so as to comply with the statute.332  As a result, this especially hurts 
lower income consumers because they are forced to pay a higher price 
that accounts for swipe fees and end up subsidizing higher income 
consumers’ frequent-flier miles.333  
On the other hand, if surcharge disclosure becomes a normal 
practice, it will no longer be a surprise at the register; eliminating the 
harm that GBL § 518 was enacted to combat.334  Additionally, open 
disclosure of surcharge fees may ultimately improve the economy.335  
Credit use may decrease, reducing the burden of credit card swipe fees 
for retailers, which should reduce overall prices for consumers and 
increase consumer spending.336   
Lastly, New York already has a false advertising statute that 
protects consumers from false advertising and bait-and-switch 
tactics.337  Therefore, the state’s asserted harm cannot be concrete 
because the state already has a remedy in place for that harm.338  As 
such, the Second Circuit should find that GBL § 518 fails the second 
prong of the Central Hudson test, as the harm it seeks to remedy is 
merely speculative.339 
General Business Law § 518 fails the third prong of the Central 
Hudson test because it is not narrowly tailored and does not directly 
advance the asserted governmental interest.340  The State, on the one 
 
329 Statement, supra note 40, at 235-36. 
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hand, argued in its brief that the law “implements a narrow regulation 
that directly advances the State’s substantial interests in protecting 
consumers from unfair profiteering, preventing deceptive and abusive 
sales tactics, and reducing consumer confusion that harms the 
economy.”341  The plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that the law is 
not narrowly tailored and stated that a more narrow approach would be 
a regulation of excessive surcharges, not a complete ban on 
surcharges.342   
Even if the no surcharge law was narrowly tailored, it does not 
directly advance the state’s interests.343  Hiding the actual cost of credit 
card use in a single pricing scheme or masking credit card fees as a 
cash discount is, in itself, deceptive.344  Also, although implementing 
a single price may reduce confusion, it most likely does not benefit the 
economy.345  When consumers are encouraged to use credit cards 
without restraint, consumer debt and bankruptcies increase.346  
Therefore, GBL § 518 does not directly advance the state’s interest in 
consumer protection.347 
Finally, GBL § 518 fails the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson test because it is broader than necessary.348  Even though the 
State argued that New York’s no surcharge law prevents false 
advertising and bait-and-switch tactics, the statute is unnecessary 
because New York already has a false advertising statute that protects 
consumers from those practices.349  Furthermore, as stated by the 
plaintiffs, the state cannot “ban an entire category of speech because 
some of it has the potential to mislead.”350  Credit surcharges can be 
implemented in a way that promotes consumer protection and 
transparency.351  The purpose of GBL § 518, to protect consumers from 
surprises at the register and unfair pricing strategies, can be 
accomplished by implementing credit surcharge pricing policy 
disclosure and a credit surcharge cap, as suggested by the Eleventh 
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Circuit and the Eastern District of California.352  Therefore, the Second 
Circuit should find that a complete ban on credit surcharges is more 
extensive than necessary. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit should find that GBL § 518 fails to satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test and should be 
struck down as an impermissible restriction of commercial speech 
under the First Amendment.353  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“[i]f the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, 
absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict 
expression because of the effect its message is likely to have on the 
public.”354   
For the reasons stated above, the clear and present danger 
element is missing in allowing retailers to impose credit surcharges.355  
Commercial expression is important to the exchange of ideas in our 
society and this principle should weigh heavily on the Second Circuit’s 
decision.356  The veil needs to be lifted because consumers should 
know exactly for what they are paying.357 
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